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Mezitransakční poplatek – konkurenceschopnost 
platebních nástrojů 
Interchange Fee – Competitiveness of Payment 
Instruments
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Abstrakt:
Purpose of the article: This study describes the markets of payment instruments. It focuses mainly on the 
systems of credit and debit cards. Authors identify key moments in theory used in this dilemma, called Tourist 
Test. The market of credit cards and direct debit system is 4 side business, where the Interchange fee plays 
very important role. 
Methodology/methods: In this paper was applied secondary research. The secondary research was based on 
analysis of papers and literature published about Interchange fee including European Commission together 
with polemic about payment instruments market competitiveness. 
Scientific aim: The aim of this article is to identify the rules, conditions on the market of payment instruments 
- the system of credit cards and direct debit system. The authors try to recognize the problems on the demand 
and supply side. The authors focus on defying the cost-benefit approach, contributed with Tourist test. The 
Interchange Fee plays the key role. 
Findings: The approach of the scientific literature pays attention to costs and benefits, its equilibrium, also 
talking about social utility and social welfare the author is missing the whole impact on end consumer welfare 
and satisfaction. The dilemma is even more complicated due to the fact that the end consumer does not know 
he or she is not maximizing his or her utility, apart from the merchant, who is under pressure of margin squeeze. 
Conclusions: It is needed to start to measure the effectiveness and influence which the existence of Interchange 
Fee brings. Of course, confront the effectiveness and influence with benefits the Interchange Fee has.
Key words: interchange fee, Tourist Test, cards payment, Direct debit system, information asymmetry, 
competitiveness.
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Introduction
Competitiveness is one of the biggest assumptions 
of functional market system. Regarding the IT de-
velopment there are many payment instruments. In 
post-communist countries, ready cash are still the 
most popular payment instrument, but the importan-
ce of credit cards increases constantly. The credit or 
debit cards belong to the most used payment instru-
ment concerning the small retailing and end consu-
mer, even the total amount of all European payments 
are done by cash is close to 80%. The total number 
of non-cash payments in the EU, using all types of 
instruments, increased by 4.2% to 94.5 billion in 
2012 compared with the previous year. Card pay-
ments accounted for 42% of all transactions, while 
credit transfers accounted for 27% and direct debits 
for 24%.The number of credit transfers within the 
EU increased in 2012 by 3.0% to 25.7 billion. The 
importance of paper-based transactions continued to 
decrease, with the ratio of paper-based transactions 
to non-paper-based transactions standing at around 
one to five1.
However the amount and popularity of credit or 
debit cards is still increasing.
What are the influences of competitive markets? 
It is necessary to consider the industry.. Besides the 
industry there are other aspects – mainly external 
ones: business environment, law conditions, level 
of country development, culture habits, closest and 
strongest competitors, geographical position togeth-
er with sources needed etc.
The law regulations and action of antitrust au-
thorities are not features of competitiveness market. 
Unfortunately, the market of payment instruments 
and the dilemma of interchange fee has those fea-
tures. In 2002 the European Commission exempt-
ed Visa’s multilateral interchange fees from Article 
81 of the EC Treaty that prohibits anti-competitive 
arrangements2. However, this exemption has ex-
pired in December 31, 20073. In 2003, the Reserve 
Bank of Australia required that interchange fees 
1 ECB, Payment statistics for 2012 , available at: http://
www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr130910.
en.html
2 Commission exempts multilateral interchange fees 
for cross-border Visa card payments, 2002, available 
at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?ref 
erence=IP/02/1138&format=HTML&aged=1&lan 
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en.
3 In the United Kingdom, MasterCard has reduced its 
interchange fees while it is under investigation by the 
Office of Fair Trading.
was dramatically reduced, from about 0.95% of the 
transaction to approximately 0.5%. One notable re-
sult has been the reduced use of reward cards and in-
creased use of debit cards. Following in November 
2006, New Zealand consider similar actions, alleg-
ing price-fixing by Visa and MasterCard; merchants 
pay a 1.8% fee on every credit card transaction. In 
December 19, 2007, the European Commission4 is-
sued a decision prohibiting MasterCard’s multilat-
eral interchange fee for cross-border payment card 
transactions with MasterCard and Maestro branded 
debit and consumer credit cards5.  MasterCard has 
appealed the Commission’s decision before the EU 
Court of First Instance; while the appeal is pending 
MasterCard has temporarily repealed its multilateral 
interchange fees. In March 26, 2008, the European 
Commission opened an investigation into Visa’s 
multilateral interchange fees for cross-border trans-
actions within the EEA as well as into the “Honor 
All Cards” rule (under which merchants are required 
to accept all valid Visa-branded cards)6. More over 
the antitrust authorities of EU Member States other 
than the United Kingdom such as Poland7, Israel, 
Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and the Netherlands are 
also investigating MasterCard’s and Visa’s inter-
change fees8.
There is a reason for those huge reactions of regu-
lative authorities. The aim of this article is the mar-
ket of payment instruments does not work properly.
The company’s competitiveness is directly de-
pending on competitive strategy. Definition of the 
competitive strategy should be “activities and app-
roaches sequence to provide higher probability of 
4 The Commission concluded that this fee violated Article 
81 of the EC Treaty that prohibits anti-competitive agre-
ements.
5 Antitrust: Commission prohibits MasterCard’s intra-
-EEA Multilateral Interchange Fees, 2007, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?referen 
ce=IP/07/1959.
6 Antitrust: Commission initiates formal proceedings 
against Visa Europe Limited, 2008, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refe-
ren ce=MEMO/08/170&format=HTML&aged=0&lan 
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en.
7 For example, on January 4, 2007, the Polish Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection fined twenty 
banks a total of PLN 164 million (about $56 million) for 
jointly setting MasterCard’s and Visa’s interchange fees.
8 Office of Competition and Consumers’ Protection, De-
partment of International Relations and Communication 
Unlawful practices of banks, Poland 2007, available at: 
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/en/press_office/press_releases 
/art72.html.
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success in terms of achieving its goals in its field and 
moment” (Bartes, 1999, p. 93). It seems to be easier to 
define the company’s competitiveness instead of mar-
ket competitiveness. But as it is known from theory, 
there are conditions for perfect competition. Theory 
differs from the real world. The real world economy 
is trying to get as close as possible to perfect competi-
tion conditions. Reaching it is impossible.
Can a company be competitive, meanwhile the 
market is not? Are the companies able to cope appro-
priately with their competitors on non-competitive 
market? Logically the competitiveness cannot be 
measured if the market is not competitive (or even 
one niche part of the market). The authors assume 
that the necessity for competitive environment is 
needed as a stepping stone. According to economic 
theory, the competitive environment may be such an 
environment where are not entry barriers; the entry 
costs are low; there is not only one or few big play-
ers on the market; all the companies on the market 
are selling their goods in price above the costs; the 
market is not too concentrated; the switching costs 
are low etc. The aspects described above can be me-
asured in different ways, always connected to size of 
the market and other features.
According to U.S. Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission a market is defined as a 
product or group of products and a geographic area 
in which it is produced or sold such that a hypotheti-
cal profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price regu-
lation, that was the only present and future producer 
or seller of those products in that area likely would 
impose at least a “small but significant and no transi-
tory” increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of 
all other products are held constant9. A relevant mar-
ket is a group of products and a geographic area that 
is no bigger than necessary to satisfy this test. The 
“small but significant and non transitory” increase 
in price is employed solely as a methodological tool 
for the analysis of mergers: it is not a tolerance level 
for price increases.
The competitive authorities are solving the inter-
change fee last decade. Surprisingly the end con-
sumer uses its card, and do not care about the in-
terchange fee. Why? The aim of this article is what 
does interchange fee mean, how the payment using 
credit card works and how it can be competitive 
with other payment instruments is.
9 U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Co-
mmission. Justice.gov [online]. April 8, 1997. [cit. 
2010-09-30]. Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Available 
at: <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz 
_book/hmg1.html>.
1.   Statement of Problem – Payment 
Systems
The market conditions changes. Nowadays, more 
than ever before, we are entering the information 
century and “e-money” is being used more and more 
in many different ways. Not only different e-money 
is occurring, but also together with IT development 
even lots of new types of payments too. Meanwhile 
cost of cash its bearer knows well, the conditions 
of payment through the electronic money (e-purses) 
are usually written on the page. The exact costs of 
payment with card the end consumer and carrier of 
the card have no idea about. This may be called as 
the information asymmetry. But it is too soon to say 
this.
In this article the author focuses mostly on e-pa-
yments. The market of payment instruments is not 
easy to define. Relinquish the geographical segmen-
tation, and let focus on the different payment instru-
ments commonly used by end consumer. They are:
 ● Cash.
 ● Credit transfer.
 ● Payment cards.
 ● Electronic money/e-purses.
 ● Cheques10.
 ● Direct Debit system11 (together with R-transac-
tions12).
10 The cheques are not commonly used in Czech Republic.
11 Direct debit scheme is a set of functions, procedures, ar-
rangements, rules and devices that enable an authorized 
debit of the payer’s payment account initiated by the pa-
yee, either as a single payment or a series of payments. 
The oversight framework covers the entire payment 
cycle, i.e. the initiation phase, the transaction phase and 
the clearing and settlement phase. It takes into account 
concerns relating to both the retail payment system and 
the payment instrument used (European Central Bank, 
2009).
12 R-transactions is the umbrella term for the following 
terms: Refunds are claims by the payer for reimburse-
ment of contested debits on the account.
 Refusals are instructions issued by the payer prior to 
settlement, for whatever reason, to the effect that the 
payer’s PSP should not make a direct debit payment.
 Reject is the result of a failed transaction whereby the 
payment has already been declined prior to interbank 
settlement. Possible causes include technical reasons, 
closed account, insufficient funds.
 Returns are direct debit collections that are diverted 
from normal execution following interbank settlement 
and are initiated by the payer’s PSP.
 Reversal is initiated by the payee after settlement in 
the event that a direct debit that has already been paid 
should not have been processed. Consequently, it is the 
reimbursement of funds by the payee to the payer.
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The author focuses mostly on Payment cards and 
Direct Debit system. Meanwhile the payment cards 
are used personally by end customer, the Direct de-
bit is a payment service for debiting a payer’s pa-
yment account, whereby a payment transaction is 
initiated by the payee on the basis of the payer’s 
consent which has been given to the payee, to the 
payee’s payment service provider or to the payer’s 
own payment service.
Banks throughout the Single Euro Payments Area 
(SEPA) are now gradually starting to deliver SEPA 
Direct Debit services to their customers. All bran-
ches of banks in the euro area must be reachable for 
SEPA Core Direct Debit by 1st November 2010 as 
mandated by the EU Regulation on cross-border pa-
yments in the Community13.
These days the European Central Bank provides 
an overview of the set of tools and instruments that 
the Euro system employs and underlines the fact 
that payment instruments are an essential part of pa-
yment systems. The risks involved in providing and 
using payment instruments have not generally been 
considered to be of systemic concern, but the safety 
and efficiency of payment instruments are important 
for both maintaining confidence in the currency and 
promoting an efficient economy.
SEPA Direct Debit services enable customers – for 
the first time ever – to make and receive both domes-
tic and cross-border euro direct debit payments throu-
ghout the 32 SEPA countries, i.e. the 27 EU Member 
States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland 
and Monaco. The direct debit is a major payment 
instrument widely used in many euro area countries.
SEPA offers significant benefits for bank custo-
mers. The implementation of innovative and compe-
titive SEPA payment services based on global ISO 
standards translates into efficiency gains for busi-
nesses and public administrations, while consumers 
can rely on a single set of euro payment instruments 
covering 32 countries: one bank account, one bank 
card, one SEPA Credit Transfer, one SEPA Direct 
Debit.
1.1  Card Network Payment System
Focusing on payment cards system we recognize 
 Revocation is the request by the payee to recall the di-
rect debit collection prior to acceptance by the payee’s 
PSP.
13 The European Payments Council (EPC), the coordinati-
on and decision-making body of the European banking 
industry in relation to payments, launches the SEPA 
Core Direct Debit Scheme and the SEPA Business to 
Business Direct Debit Scheme on 2nd November 2009. 
four different sides of the business actors. Firstly 
there is the end consumer, the holder of his or her 
card. Then to make a deal the merchant is needed. 
Merchant, who is provided with POS machine and is 
able to accept payment cards. Other business actors 
are banks. It is Issuer bank, the bank which provides 
to the end customer the card, and the Acquires bank, 
bank which transfer the payment to the merchant.
Another player is Smith’s invincible market hand. 
In this case it is the cost of the sold good to the end 
consumer. It is also the price of payment made by 
the payment card for the purpose of the purchase of 
the good. Here are specific fees. It is not only a fee 
between banks; there is a processing fee too. One of 
the fees, called Interchange fee seems to be the fee 
for interbank (acquiring and issuer bank) commu-
nication. But who pays this fee? Banks? Merchant? 
Or the end consumer? The situation and the role of 
interchange fee is demonstrated on the Figure 1.
The interchange fee (IF) paid by the merchant’s 
bank (acquires bank) to the cardholder’s bank (issuer 
bank) allocates the total cost of the payment service 
between the two users, end consumer and merchant; 
in payment cards systems Visa or MasterCard.
There are different successful competitive strate-
gies, but as polemic of Interchange Fee reminds the 
margin squeeze at the merchant side.
After findings of competition authorities, courts 
of justice and banking regulators it has been seen 
that the IFs are set unacceptably high. The reason 
for this is the fact that system of paying using pa-
yment cards belongs to so called network business 
and there is information asymmetry. In a January 
2007 survey of about 2,000 adults by polling servi-
ce Harris Interactive, 32% had heard of interchange 
fees. Once the fees were explained to them, 91% 
Figure 1.  System of Interchange Fee. Source: http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d06929.pdf, p. 74, US Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), September, 2008.
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said Congress should compel credit card companies 
to better inform consumers about interchange fees14.
There do not work competitive rules due to end 
consumer information asymmetry and the existence 
of net business. What is happening is that merchant 
have to accept the cards because they do not want 
to impair their ability to attract customers; cards are 
“must-take cards”.
Many surveys have been done on the potential 
anticompetitive effects of IFs in antitrust literatu-
re, mainly Carlton and Frankel (1995), Evans and 
Schmalensee (1995), Frankel (1998), Chang and 
Evans (2000), Balto (2000), Rochet and Tirole 
(2002), Schmalensee (2002), and Wright (2004).
Schemes may exploit this by setting excessive 
MIFs and this may create rent extraction by banks. 
In that case payment cards become more costly com-
pared to other payment instruments for merchants.
2.   Interchange Fee in Credit Card and 
Direct Debit Structure
There are several models of interchange fee structu-
re based on different assumptions. Baxter15 provides 
the seminal analysis of interchange fees in a pay-
ment scheme, an analysis that was used to defend 
the legality of competing banks collectively setting 
interchange fees in National Bancard Corp. vs. Visa 
USA.
14 http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/02/business/fi- 
credit2.
15 Baxter, W.P. Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: 
Legal Perspectives. Journal of Law and Economics, 
1983, p. 541–588.
Baxter16 analysis relies on three underlying 
assumptions:
1. Perfect competition between issuers and between 
acquirers.
2. M.erchants that accept cards do not attract custo-
mers from rivals who do not.
3. All merchants get the same benefits from accep-
ting cards.
According to Wright17 assumption (1) implies 
card schemes are indifferent to the level of inter-
change fees. Assumption (2) leads to biased wel-
fare conclusions, given that business stealing is not 
accounted for. Assumption (3) leaves unanswered 
how interchange fees should be set given heteroge-
neity across merchants.
Recently, three papers have analyzed interchange 
fees, addressing these assumptions. Rochet and Ti-
role18 desist from assumptions (1) and (2), while 
Schmalensee19 desist from (1) and (3). In Wright20, 
Wright desist from (1)–(3) but without (1).
The authors do not rely on assumption (1) and 
after interviewing the merchants do not agree with 
assumption (3). Why? Rochet and Tirole explain 
16 Baxter, W.P. Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: 
Legal Perspectives. Journal of Law and Economics, 
1983, p. 541–588.
17 Wright, J. Pricing in Debit and Credit Card Schemes. 
Economics Letters, 80, 2003, p. 305–309.
18 Rochet, J.C., Tirole, J. Cooperation among Competi-
tors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations. 
RAND Journal of Economics, 33, 2002, p. 549–570.
19 Schmalensee, R. Platform Competition in Two-Sided 
Markets. Journal of the European Economic Associati-
on, 1(4), 2003, p.990–1029.
20 Wright, J. Pricing in Debit and Credit Card Schemes. 
Economics Letters, 80, 2003, p. 305–309.
Figure 2.  Fee structure while paying by card. Source: Rochet, J. C., J. Tirole (2006), “Must-Take Cards and the Tourist 
Test”, IDEI discussion paper, Toulouse University.
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the payment with card on picture above. Apart from 
interchange fee the other important variables are 
costs and benefits. The costs usually differ concer-
ning many factors, mainly the total among of sold 
goods. Both costs and benefits are divided to fourth-
-sided scheme. The authors says it is consumer who 
pays most of the costs created within the payment 
system. There are also benefits of merchant. But are 
there really? This paper brings the idea that parts 
of the system-costs that the customer does not pay, 
go straight to merchant and affect its margin. Even 
the literature says that the interchange fee is part of 
acquirers’ costs21.
There is also the issuers and acquirers bank po-
int of view. The competitive authorities enter into 
the interchange fee business last decade a lot. For 
example Australia removed the “no surcharge” rule 
to prevent merchants from charging a credit card 
usage fee to the cardholder. A surcharge would miti-
gate or even exceed the merchant discount paid by a 
merchant, but would also make the cardholder more 
reluctant to use the card as the method of payment. 
Australia has also made changes to the interchange 
rates on debit cards, and has considered abolishing 
interchange fees altogether.
2.1  Direct Debit Scheme
According to European Central Bank the Direct 
debit scheme can be regarded as a set of functions, 
21 Wright, J. Pricing in Debit and Credit Card Schemes. 
Economics Letters, 80, 2003, p. 305–309.
procedures, arrangements, rules and device that ena-
ble the authorized debiting of the payer’s payment 
account, initiated by the payee either as a single pa-
yment or a series of payments22.
A direct debit scheme can be broken down into 
six sub-systems:
1. overall scheme management,
2. direct debit use,
3. direct debit payee sub-system,
4. direct debit payer sub-system,
5. operational facilities,
6. clearing and settlement.
The direct debit use sub-system covers the relati-
onships between the payer and the payee (mandates, 
information regarding transactions).
The direct debit payee sub-system includes, nota-
bly, accreditation and management of payees, moni-
toring of activity and fraud, verification, forwarding 
and execution of transactions (including R-transac-
tions). These activities are generally assumed by the 
payee’s PSP.
The direct debit payer sub-system deals with 
the relationship with payers and the execution of 
transactions. These activities are generally assumed 
by the payer’s PSP.
22 Source: 5.11 Directive 2007/64/EC 1 og the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 
on payment services in the internal market amending 
Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 
2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC (Text with 
EEA relevance).
Figure 3.  Direct Debit Schemes. Source: European Central Bank, 2009.
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The operational facilities sub-system represents 
technical and organizational services, for exam-
ple, the telecommunication network enabling the 
exchange of data between the payee’s PSP and the 
payer’s PSP during the different phases, or other 
services such as the allocation of identifiers. These 
activities may be specific to the direct debit scheme 
or common with other services and may be perfor-
med by the same entities as clearing and settlement.
The clearing and settlement sub-system concerns 
all activities and infrastructures needed for the bila-
teral or multilateral clearing and settlement of direct 
debit transactions. Different forms of clearing and 
settlement may be used within the scheme.
The different sub-systems present in the direct 
debit scheme are described below. The subsystems 
are presented on the basis of the tasks they carry out, 
and not on that of the physical elements or entities 
that carry them out. It should be clarified that, within 
each sub-system, several entities may be involved in 
performing the related tasks.
The overall scheme management sub-systems are 
dedicated to governance. Its responsibilities include, 
for example, the definition and evolution of stan-
dards, rules and specifications or the selection and 
adoption of existing ones, as well as policies con-
cerning access to the scheme, competition, pricing, 
fraud prevention, governance, monitoring of activi-
ties, compliance with the standards, dispute resolu-
tion, etc.
3.   Discussion – Competition and Tourist 
Test
Wright23 says the level of interchange fee determines 
the relative fees faced by cardholders versus mer-
chants. A higher interchange fee raises the costs of 
acquirers, who will charge merchants more, and lo-
wers the effective costs of issuers, who will charge 
cardholders less (or in fact, provide them with reba-
tes). MIFs increase the cost of acquiring banks and 
decrease the cost of issuing banks but the margin of 
the merchants is in account too.
Actually it is not wrong to have asymmetric price 
structures in two-sided markets indeed; asymmetric 
price structures are standard in most two-sided indu-
stries (e.g., media, software).
But there is one difference in payment card mar-
kets which is significant: on the merchant side, typi-
cally no price signals that would allow consumers to 
23 Wright, J. Pricing in Debit and Credit Card Schemes. 
Economics Letters, 80, 2003, p. 305–309.
take the impact of their payment instrument choice 
on merchants into account are transmitted (those 
ones which can be positive or negative)!
Schemes may exploit this by setting excessive 
MIFs and this may create rent extraction by banks. 
The fees are “not a cost-based calculation, but a va-
lue-based calculation,” said Elizabeth Buse, Visa’s 
global head of product24. In that case payment cards 
become more costly compared to other payment in-
struments for merchants.
To examine the real competitiveness of credit 
cards payments between others payment instru-
ments it is necessary to truly define the costs and 
benefits. The competitiveness of card payment in-
strument has been already established using Tourist 
Test25 which says that IF ≤ transactional benefits of 
card payments, which means by Baxter economic 
analysis26:
 b
B
 + b
S
 ≥ c
B
 + c
S
 = c ,  (1)
which leads to assumption that
 p
B
 = c
B
 – a = c – b
S .  (2)
That after calculations make
 p
S
 = c
S
 + a = b
S .  (3)
So the usage of credit card as payment is when
 b
B
 ≥ p
B
 = c – b
S .  (4)
But what are those costs and benefits27 exactly for 
each different payment instrument?
3.1  Costs
Costs mentioned above refer to the costs incurred 
by the merchants in conducting a transaction with 
a specific payment instrument. Such costs inclu-
de external costs (fees paid to external parties for 
effectuating a transaction, like merchant service 
charges) and internal costs (costs of the merchant 
24 Source: http://www.hardwaremerchandising.com/news/
visa-acknowledges-rates-charged-have-nothing-to-do-
-with-costs/1000354766/?&er=NA.
25 Source: Rochet, J. C., Tirole, J. Must-Take Cards and 
the Tourist Test. IDE discussion paper, Toulouse Uni-
versity, 2006.
26 Baxter, W. P. Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: 
Legal Perspectives. Journal of Law and Economics, 
1983, p. 541–588.
27 According to Zenger merchants’ willingness to pay for 
cards consists of two factors:
 Transactional benefits (e.g., immediate cost benefits 
compared to other means of payment).
 Additional spend (e.g., the competitive desire to accept 
cards to offer customers a good service).
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for effectuating the transaction, like staff costs). For 
the calculation simplification in future the total costs 
provided is split into fixed costs (like the purchase of 
a terminal) and variable costs (like merchant service 
charges28).
The different character of costs comes from diffe-
rent cost source:
 ● processing costs,
 ● financial costs (e.g. bank fees, POS terminal pur-
chase),
 ● time investment (e.g. long transaction time be-
tween different accounts or weekend transfers),
 ● administrative and staff costs,
 ● organisational costs restructuring and other costs.
3.2 Benefits
Benefits can be expressed in the same format as 
costs (fixed, variable, etc.).
It is important to focus on transactional benefits 
of different means of payment. These are benefits 
deriving from the use of one payment instrument re-
lative to another one.
Sources of transactional benefits:
 ● financial benefits,
 ● time savings,
 ● operational and processing savings,
 ● administrative and staff benefits,
 ● organizational restructuring and other benefits.
The aspect of collecting those data, verifying, 
sorting and analyzing them is challenging because 
all the costs and benefits differ a lot according to 
its bearer. Another market imperfection is that con-
sumers may overuse costly payment instruments 
because they are not faced its impact on merchants.
Wright says the level of interchange fee deter-
mines the relative fees faced by cardholders versus 
merchants29. A higher interchange fee raises the 
costs of acquirers, who will charge merchants more, 
and lowers the effective costs of issuers, who will 
charge cardholders less (or in fact, provide them 
with rebates). MIFs increase the cost of acquiring 
banks and decrease the cost of issuing banks but the 
margin of the merchants is in account too. Actually 
it is not wrong to have asymmetric price structu-
res in two-sided markets indeed; asymmetric price 
structures are standard in most two-sided industries 
(e.g., media, software).
To examine the real competitiveness of credit 
28 In particular, it should split them into variable costs per 
transaction and variable costs that increase with the va-
lue of a transaction.
29 Source: Wright, J. Pricing in Debit and Credit Card 
Schemes. Economics Letters, 80, 2003, p. 305–309.
cards payments between others payment instru-
ments it is necessary to define the costs processing 
costs (financial costs (e.g. bank fees, POS terminal 
purchase), time investment (e.g. long transaction 
time between different accounts or weekend trans-
fers), administrative and staff costs, organizational 
costs restructuring and other costs), and benefits (fi-
nancial benefits, time savings, operational and pro-
cessing savings, administrative and staff benefits, 
organizational restructuring and other benefits
Tourist Test30 says that until costs are equal to bene-
fits, the market seems to be competitive. The authors 
abstract from the theory of Tourist Test and think 
about other two aspects. There is already strong in-
formation asymmetry on the payment cards market 
for long time. The fact of missing information is hi-
dden quite well in this business, because there is net 
business (4 parties) and because it is long way be-
tween end consumer and merchant, even in time of 
processing purchase they stand in front of each other.
In some other countries, it is usual that paying in 
cash the end consumer gets lower price or even for 
some type of goods it is even impossible to pay by 
cards. But is this the feature of competitive market, 
or is it a mark that something wrong is happening 
here? This sign reminds above mentioned margin 
squeeze. But thinking about margin squeeze, does 
that happened to every merchant with POS?
Not only in payment cards but also in case of 
Direct Debit System should all actors and potential 
actors are easily able to access relevant information. 
Only sensitive information should be disclosed on a 
need-to know basis.
All actors (payees’ PSPs, payers’ PSPs, payees 
and payers) should have access to relevant informa-
tion in order to evaluate risks affecting them, inclu-
ding financial risks. Moreover, sufficient informati-
on should be provided to the payers by other actors 
(e.g. payers’ PSPs and payees).
Competition forces lower prices. But for payment 
networks like Visa and MasterCard, competition in 
the card business is more about winning over banks 
that actually issue the cards than consumers who use 
them. Visa and MasterCard set the fees that mer-
chants must pay the cardholder’s bank. And higher 
fees mean higher profits for banks, even if it means 
that merchants shift the cost to consumers.
Critics complain that Visa does not fight fair, and 
that it used its market power to force merchants to 
accept higher costs for debit cards. Merchants say 
30 Source: Rochet, J. C., Tirole, J. Must-Take Cards and 
the Tourist Test. IDE discussion paper, Toulouse Uni-
versity, 2006.
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they cannot refuse Visa cards because it would result 
in lower sales. 31
“A dollar is no longer a dollar in this country,” 
said Mallory Duncan, senior vice president of the 
National Retail Federation, a trade association. “It’s 
a Visa dollar. It’s only worth 99 cents because they 
take a piece of every one.”32
Conclusion
In most basic courses, a competitive market is de-
scribed as a situation in which there are many buyers 
and sellers, the product is homogeneous, informa-
tion is complete, and there is free entry and exit in 
the long run. Note that the first three properties are 
there to lead us to the assumption that firms are pri-
ce-takers. The fourth property ensures that the long-
-run equilibrium price is equal to the unit cost of 
production and distribution.
Competitiveness on the market of payment in-
strument cannot be seriously measured while there 
are missing the price signals for end consumer. The 
system of IF and the whole structure of costs of one 
card transaction are split over four different parties 
together with no information for customer in advan-
ce about interchange fee. The transparency is absent 
here. The reason for this is the fact that system of 
paying using payment cards belongs to so called ne-
twork business and there is information asymmetry.
The impact of SEPA, however, transcends mo-
netary policy and payments services. The European 
Commission expects the legal and technical SEPA 
harmonization exercise to facilitate the demateriali-
zation of business processes by replacing paper-ba-
sed procedures with standardized electronic soluti-
ons such as e-invoicing.
On the other hand what invisible hand of market? 
Laissez-faire? Is the market with payment instru-
ments working correctly enough to set certain level 
of competitiveness?
The Direct Debit Scheme should have effective, 
accountable and transparent governance arrange-
ments which is one of five standards the European 
Central Bank have established. Effective, efficient 
and transparent rules and processes should be defi-
ned and implemented when:
31 Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/your- mo-
ney /credit-and-debit-cards/05visa.html?pagewan ted= 
all&_r=0.
32 Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/your-money 
/credit-and-debit-cards/05visa.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0.
 ● making decisions about business objectives and 
policies, including access policies,
 ● reviewing performance, usability and convenien-
ce of the direct debit scheme,
 ● identifying, mitigating and reporting significant 
risks to the scheme’s operation.
There should be an effective internal control fra-
mework, including an adequate and independent 
audit function. The correct signals can be made by 
publication of interchange fees, Honor-all-cards rule 
or no-surcharge rule.
Competitiveness on the market of payment instru-
ments cannot be seriously measured while there are 
missing the end consumer price signals. The system of 
IF and the whole structure of costs of one card transac-
tion are split over the four different parties together 
with no information for customer in advance about in-
terchange fee. The transparency is absent here.
Anyway the approach of the scientific literature 
pays attention to costs and benefits, its equilibrium, 
also talking about social utility and social welfare 
the author is missing the whole impact on end con-
sumer welfare and satisfaction. The dilemma is even 
more complicated due to the fact that the end consu-
mer does not know he or she is not maximizing his 
or her utility, apart from the merchant, who is under 
pressure of margin squeeze. It is needed to start to 
measure the effectiveness and influence which the 
existence of Interchange Fee brings. Of course, con-
front the effectiveness and influence with benefits 
the Interchange Fee has.
Merchant lawsuits claim that interchange fees in 
the U.S. are out of line with falling technology costs 
and similar fees charged outside the United States, 
resulting in higher prices, lower profits and harm to 
the consumer. The lawsuits allege that these high 
fees represent collusion and price fixing among the 
bank card networks and their card issuing banks, 
in violation of antitrust laws. Bank card networks 
disagrees, claiming interchange fees represent an 
effort to balance incentives to issuing banks to issue 
more cards with better rewards against the need to 
bring an optimum number of card-accepting mer-
chants into their credit card systems. They also 
claim that the interchange fees bring consumer be-
nefits such as more rewards, reduced fraud, lower 
interest rates and system innovations33.
The structure of costs for each side of this network 
market is complicated and for certain reason there is 
33 Lyon, M. J. The Interchange Fee Debate: Issues and 
Economics. [online]. June, 2006 [cit. 2010-09-30]. 
Available at: <http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publica-
tions_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3235>.
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also the intention from banks for no simplification. 
Measure the benefits of merchants is disputable too. 
But as long as price signals are absent, the competi-
tiveness is absent too.
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